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The IMF as the main monetary forum
With the collapse of the system of fixed exchange rates in
the early 1970s the IMF forfeited its central monetary
role. Nothing has since happened to change this loss of
importance. The present international monetary system is
dominated by three currencies, the dollar, the euro and the
yen. There is no sign that the American, European and
Japanese central banks, or the governments behind the
three currencies, intend to abandon their dominant
position in the international monetary system to the IMF.
In the future the IMF will have to content itself with
continuing to play a monetary role that essentially
concerns the financial and monetary problems of the
developing countries and countries in transition. This,
however, contrasts with the IMF's ambition, officially
endorsed by the industrialized countries, to be not only an
institution operating throughout the world but also the
institutional focus of the international monetary system.
No one can seriously question the dominant monetary
role of the USA, EMU and Japan. How they use their
power is, however, a different matter. The frequent
instances in the past of the G 7 discussing and, de facto,
deciding on the reform of the IMF and the international
financial architecture, leaving it to the press to inform the
IMF and its other members, can only be described as
inappropriate. It helps to reinforce the impression among
the developing countries and countries in transition that
the IMF is an instrument used by the western
industrialized countries for economic and monetary
operations “out of area”. It is therefore essential that the
discussions on monetary policy be moved back to the
IMF if it is to retain its credibility. The renaming of
the Interim Committee, on which developing and indus-
trialized countries are represented and which is now
known as the International Monetary and Financial
Committee, should be accompanied by an actual up-
grading of this body. The establishment in the autumn of
1999 of the G 20, in which the leading industrialized
countries and the emerging economies consider aspects of
the international financial architecture, is an extremely
questionable development because it helps to weaken the
IMF's role.
Economic and monetary advice
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With the international monetary system dominated by the USA, by the European Monetary Union and Japan, all
important decisions on monetary policy will continue to be taken within the G 7 framework. For the foreseeable future
the IMF will have to content itself with a role that is essentially geared to ensuring the monetary stabilization of the
developing and newly industrializing countries, and especially of the emerging economies. The emphasis here is on four
areas of responsibility:
• Monetary forum: Regardless of the special role played by the G 7, the IMF should be developed into the world's
main monetary forum. Only if the newly industrializing and developing countries are appropriately involved in the
reform of the international financial architecture can the IMF live up to its claim to universality. In these
circumstances, the establishment in the autumn of 1999 of the G 20, in which the leading industrialized and newly
industrializing countries are represented, counteracts the planned upgrading of the IMF’s International Monetary
and Financial Committee.
• Economic and monetary advice for its members countries will continue to be one of the IMF's principal tasks in the
future. It is the most important contribution the IMF makes to crisis prevention. The IMF should be given the
mandate of an "enlarged information policy", enabling it in specific cases to inform the public about critical
developments in a country or even to issue a warning if it becomes clear that the government concerned is unwilling
to take action against serious undesirable developments in its own country. Greater discipline over a country's
economic policy might then be maintained through the markets.
• The financing facilities are the IMF's most important instrument in the management of financial and monetary crises.
However, they form an extremely complex, bureaucratic system of arrangements, which has also lost its inner logic
with the passage of time. Apart from the existing credit facilities and a new crisis facility that covers all kinds of
crisis, all the facilities should be completely abandoned. The same applies to the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility. The scope of the credit facilities should be increased accordingly, and terms of maturity should be
determined flexibly to suit the nature and magnitude of the balance-of-payments problems.
• The IMF should expand its service functions, some of which it is already performing. They include the preparation of
statistics, analyses and assessments, technical cooperation with developing countries and countries in transition and
mediation, as in relations between creditors and debtor countries at the time of debt crises.
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has been one of the IMF's most important tasks for years
and is primarily aimed at preventing crises. It is also the
most difficult task, because it not only entails the risk of
erroneous assessment but also requires a high degree of
sensitivity in dealings with national decision-makers.
What first needs to be clarified, then, is how intensive the
IMF's advice should be and when it should be given. The
consultations under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of
Agreement take place normally once a year.They are not
binding on the member country concerned. In other
words, members may take the IMF's advice, but they are
not forced to. In many cases they do not. Thus before the
outbreak of the financial crisis in Asia such countries as
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia were so blinded by
their own success that they turned a deaf ear to any
warning of undesirable structural developments. For
larger countries, such as India, China and Brazil,
independence from the IMF is mainly a question of
national prestige. Other countries fail to see the need for
structural adjustments or do not have the strength to
undertake them.
A far more intensive form of advice and analysis of
economic and monetary problems is possible only when
the member country wants to take advantage of Fund
resources. The dialogue on economic policy then gives
way to conditionality. The various credit tranches are
disbursed only if the member country satisfies the agreed
economic conditions. As this normally requires the
country to make major and highly unpopular adjust-
ments, governments understandably put off using Fund
resources as long as they can. As a general rule, the
impact of the IMF's conditionality therefore comes very
late, often too late.
Given these difficulties, it would be wise to equip the
IMF with an instrument that is stronger than Article IV
consultations and can be used before Fund resources are
taken and conditionality begins. Such an instrument
might, in certain cases, be an enlarged information policy
designed to maintain greater discipline over a country's
economic policy through the markets.
Since the collapse of the socialist planned economies the
developing countries too have adopted the market
economy as the model for their economic policies. Some
are now well integrated into the world economy.
Countries which have gained access to the international
financial markets are becoming increasingly dependent on
the assessment of their creditworthiness by foreign
investors and banks. The IMF should therefore be given a
mandate to inform or even warn markets specifically of
critical developments in a member country if it becomes
clear that the government concerned is unwilling to take
action against serious undesirable developments in its
own country. Maintaining discipline over government
economic policies through the markets is already a more
effective way of influencing national economic policies
than the conditions imposed by the IMF. The policy of
conditionality it has pursued and increasingly refined over
the years is still geared to a development model in which
governments are the leading actors in the development
process and the national and international markets are not
recognized as having the power to keep discipline over
government policy.
In one respect the debate on the reform of the IMF seems
to have resulted in a consensus: in the future the IMF
should concentrate on its member countries' macro
policies and withdraw from development aid, this being
the World Bank's business. On closer examination,
however, it becomes clear that the two terms macro
policy and development aid fall well short of addressing
the real problems. The strict separation of these two areas
would be acceptable only if development cooperation was
confined to the financing of individual investment
projects. In fact, development cooperation is far more
than this. The IMF's "development aid" in particular is
meant to bring about structural changes so as to make
markets and institutions more efficient and improve
conditions for a more effective macro policy. The IMF
stabilization programmes are essentially macro-oriented.
It should not be forgotten in the current debate that the
failure of many IMF programmes in the 1960s and 1970s
was due not least to the IMF's belief that no more than
monetary and macro policy needed to be addressed in
developing countries. "Do not in any circumstances get
involved in a country's internal affairs," was the
watchword at that time. It was a painful experience for the
monetary policy specialists working at the IMF to realize
that, unless the structural problems underlying monetary
and macro policies are considered, current accounts in
deficit cannot be put back on a sound footing. The IMF
therefore broadened its monetary approach not in pursuit
of an ambitious policy of increasing its authority but in
order to cater for the structural circumstances of
underdeveloped economies.
A question that arises for the IMF time and again is how
broad and how deep its analyses and conditions should be
and at what juncture the division of labour with the World
Bank begins. This division of labour cannot be deduced
from a theory: in an intensive consultative process with
the World Bank it must be determined pragmatically
which institution is to perform which tasks and what
practical form their cooperation is to take. How this can
be achieved is evident, for example, from the agreement
reached by the IMF and World Bank on cooperation in
the financial sector.
Financial aid and crisis management
Recurrent balance-of-payments problems and financial
crises in the developing countries and countries in
transition have made financial aid and crisis management
ongoing tasks for the IMF. In the final analysis, the aim is
to maintain or to restore monetary stability in these
countries in order both to ensure their sustained economic
and social development and to prevent monetary
instability from spilling over into the global financial
system. The latter applies in particular to economic and
financial crises in the emerging economies, which have
now gained so much economic weight that they are
capable of threatening the financial and monetary stability
of the OECD world.
The provision of financial aid from the IMF facilities
presupposes the conclusion of a stabilization agreement in
3which the member country concerned undertakes to carry
out economic reforms. As the IMF has endeavoured to
meet its members' financial needs as far as possible, this
instrument has, with the passage of time, become an
extremely complex, bureaucratic system of arrangements,
which has now, moreover, lost its inner logic.
Furthermore, it is not without a degree of arbitrariness in
that the amount of financial aid provided depends on the
nature and magnitude of the balance-of-payments
disequilibria, a term which does, however, leave plenty of
room for interpretation. A reform of the system of
facilities with a view to achieving greater transparency
and administrative simplification is therefore overdue.
In principle, all the facilities except the ordinary reserve
and credit facilities should be completely abandoned. The
lending capacity of the remaining facilities should then be
increased accordingly. In addition, a single facility
catering for all kinds of disaster should be established.
The terms of maturity of IMF credits should be handled
flexibly, and they should also permit longer commitments
so that appropriate account may be taken of the different
causes of balance-of-payments deficits.
Financial crisis in Asia: payments of aid initiated
by the IMF (in US $ bn)
Country IMF World
Bank/ADB
Bilateral
donors
Total
Indone-
sia
11.2 10.0 21.1 42.3
South
Korea
20.9 14.0 23.3 58.2
Thailand 4.0 2.7 10.5 17.2
Total 36.1 26.7 54.9 117.7
Source:  IMF, Annual Report, 1998
The call for IMF lending to be restricted to pure liquidity
aid, as advocated, for example, by the Meltzer
Commission, a group of experts formed by the US
Congress to draw up proposals for the reform of the
international financial institutions, ignores the realities of
the developing countries and countries in transition. In the
past too, the IMF made short-term loans only in a few
exceptional cases. Its standard conditions provide for
terms of maturity of 3 to 5 years, which in common
parlance is medium-term. Here again, it should also be
remembered that the IMF introduced facilities with long
terms of maturity in the 1980s and 1990s in response to
the almost unanimous criticism that its short-term
financial aid amounted to a policy of "overkill". The
annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank in Berlin in
1988 should be recalled in this context: mass protests,
partly militant in nature, almost resulted in a state of
emergency being declared. The pendulum of public
opinion on the maturity of IMF aid now seems to have
swung in the other direction. But what was realized in the
1980s remains valid today: not all kinds of balance-of-
payments deficits in developing countries and countries in
transition can be overcome in the short or medium term,
and not all developing countries and countries in
transition are able to overcome balance-of-payments
problems at the same speed.
The objection that the simplification of the IMF's
facilities would deprive it in certain cases of the means to
meet a member's financial needs is easily refuted. It has
never been the IMF's task to finance current account
deficits. The emphasis has always been on the catalytic
function of IMF aid. The conclusion of a stabilization
agreement is meant to send the message to the donor
countries and international capital markets that the
country in payment difficulties has initiated fundamental
adjustments to its economic policy and that it can again
be granted credits within the defined limits.
This simplification would also solve the problem of the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, the former
Structural Adjustment Facility, which occupies a special
position among all the various facilities and has long been
under fire from all sides. Given its conditions and
refinancing, it can only be classified as development aid.
The conditions governing access are also borrowed from
development cooperation: the requirement for taking
advantage of this facility is not a balance-of-payments
problem but a low per capita income. The aims of this
facility are, however, often misunderstood, although the
IMF itself is to blame for this. Former Managing Director
Camdessus's frequent comment that the IMF too was now
primarily concerned with reducing poverty gave the
impression that the frontiers with development
cooperation had been removed. That a good economic
and monetary policy also helps to reduce poverty is
usually overlooked or not associated with the concept of
poverty alleviation.
A further problem that gives rise to heated debate is the
relationship between the IMF and official donors on the
one hand and the private creditors on the other. In the
1990s the ratio of public to private financing in the
developing countries shifted sharply in favour of the
private sector. Financial crises and balance-of-payments
problems will therefore largely affect private rather than
public creditors in the future. The IMF must react to these
structural changes. The answer certainly cannot be to go
on increasing the IMF's financial capacity and to demand
even more from the official donors. The international
commercial banks are unlikely ever again to be helped out
so generously with public funds as they were in the Asian
financial crisis. Bailing out private creditors on this scale
creates counterproductive incentive structures, i.e.
incentives to the banks to continue lending money to the
developing countries without a more careful assessment
of the risks involved (moral hazard).
Long-term net capital flows to developing
countries (in US $ bn)
1985 1990 1995 1999
Official capital
flows
36.0 55.9 53.9 52.0
Private capital
flows
31.6 43.5 203.3 238.8
– Direct in-
   vestments
10.9 24.1 105.0 192.0
– Private credits 20.6 15.7 62.2 19.2
– Portfolio in- 0.1 3.7 36.1 27.6
4   vestments
Source:  DRS and OECD
The IMF's service functions
The term "service" covers a range of activities, only some
of which have so far been undertaken by the IMF with
any vigour. The IMF should systematically expand these
services and regard them as a separate, new area of
responsibility. They include the preparation and
publication of statistics. With interdependence in the
world economy growing, the demands on statistics in
terms of topicality, breakdown and international
comparability have risen sharply in recent years. If these
demands are to be met, there will need to be even closer
cooperation between the IMF and its members in the
future. There are serious deficiencies in the recording of
international capital market flows. The information on
offshore centres is inadequate. The IMF's announcement
that it intends to strengthen its staff considerably by
recruiting additional capital market experts indicates that
it is determined to perform this function more actively
than hitherto.
A second service comprises analyses and assessments. It
is a task that the IMF has performed no more than
sporadically, i.e. on request, in the past. Analyses for
world economic summits and the appraisal of a member
country's economic situation for the Paris Club are the
best known examples. The IMF should be more active in
providing these services in the future. The member
countries might, for example, ask the IMF for an
assessment of their own economic situation because they
hope the publication of the findings will lead to a positve
reaction from the international capital markets. The
Meltzer Commission has even gone so far as to propose
that the economic policies of all member countries should
undergo constant rating to give the international financial
markets a sounder basis on which to take their decisions.
Technical cooperation is another IMF service. Given the
considerable need for advice on monetary policy and the
willingness of UNDP and bilateral donors to make
financial resources available to the IMF for this purpose,
this activity has meanwhile become a permanent fixture.
Nor should there be any fundamental objections to an
expansion of technical assistance now that crisis
prevention has a far higher priority than crisis
management.
The last of the IMF's service functions to be mentioned
here is mediation. This would be particularly appropriate
at the outbreak of financial crises, when the earliest
possible arrangement between the private creditors and
the debtor country is essential. The creditors usually
comprise hundreds of banks, and it would be too late if
they left it until after the crisis had begun before they tried
to reach agreement with the debtor country. As speed is of
the essence in a crisis, the course must be set in advance.
In other words, it must be specified when the credit
agreement is concluded what the consequences will be in
the event of the debtor's insolvency. All past experience
indicates, however, that the banks deny the debtor country
the right to determine on its own the time at which
insolvency sets in. Hence the need to introduce a third,
objective party. This can only be the IMF, first, because it
has the best information for the assessment of a country's
solvency and second, because it can be assumed to be an
impartial mediator.
There are many indications that the IMF's future position
in the international monetary system will no longer be
determined primarily by its own financial capacity or the
total volume of the aid packages it is able to mobilise in a
crisis. There will continue to be financial crises in which
IMF funds are required, but not in the same way as during
the last financial crisis. Of greater importance will be the
functions and skills that accrue to the IMF from its broad
information base, its expertise, its function as an adviser
and its participation in decisions on monetary policy.
Only by consistently expanding these functions is it likely
in the foreseeable future to emerge from the shadows of
the three great players in the monetary field, the USA, the
EMU and Japan. At the same time, if the IMF is to live up
to its claim to universality, it will have to make a far
greater effort in the future to integrate the newly
industrializing countries and the other developing
countries and countries in transition than it has made in
the past.
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